Shahar Dobzinski

Weizmann Institute of Science — Israel

Decision Sciences · Social Sciences

30h-index2.6kcitations108works1.02yr avg
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Research Topics

Auction Theory and Applications(98), Game Theory and Voting Systems(38), Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing(33), Optimization and Search Problems(26), Game Theory and Applications(21)

Publications108 total

Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation
2025Open Access
Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation
arXiv (Cornell University)·2025Open Access
A Constant-Factor Approximation for Nash Social Welfare with Subadditive Valuations
2024· 3 citedOpen Access
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values
2024· 2 citedOpen Access
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
Combinatorial Reallocation Mechanisms
Algorithmica·2023
A constant factor approximation for Nash social welfare with subadditive valuations
arXiv (Cornell University)·2023· 2 citedOpen Access
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values
arXiv (Cornell University)·2023Open Access
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity
2023Open Access
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings
2023
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees
2023· 1 cited
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings
arXiv (Cornell University)·2023Open Access
Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling
Research Square (Research Square)·2023· 3 citedOpen Access
Rigidity in Mechanism Design and its Applications
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022Open Access
Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
Games and Economic Behavior·2022· 4 citedOpen Access
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022Open Access
On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
2022· 5 cited
On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022Open Access
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders
DROPS (Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz Center for Informatics)·2021Open Access
A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism
arXiv (Cornell University)·2021Open Access
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Frequent Co-authors

Noam Nisan(12), Sigal Oren(6), Robert Kleinberg(5), Shaddin Dughmi(5), Tim Roughgarden(5), Moshe Babaioff(4), Michael Schapira(4), Ron Lavi(4), Hu Fu(4), Liad Blumrosen(4), Aviv Zohar(3), M. Sundararajan(3), Jan Vondrák(3), Peerapong Dhangwatnotai(2), Itai Ashlagi(2), J. Vondrák(2), Aranyak Mehta(2), Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru(2), Christos H. Papadimitriou(1), Yaron Singer(1)