Jordi Massó

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona — Spain

Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences

19h-index1.2kcitations98works0.52yr avg
OpenAlex↗ORCID↗Google Scholar↗Lab page↗

Accepting Students?

No reports yet. Know if this professor is taking students?

Research Topics

Game Theory and Voting Systems(87), Auction Theory and Applications(62), Game Theory and Applications(29), Economic theories and models(24), Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge(13)

Publications98 total

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
Games and Economic Behavior·2024· 1 citedOpen Access
Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
Theory and Decision·2024· 1 citedOpen Access
Obviously Strategy-Proofness with Respect to a Partition
SSRN Electronic Journal·2024Open Access
Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains
Journal of Mathematical Economics·2023· 2 citedOpen Access
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
Theoretical Economics·2023· 14 citedOpen Access
False-Name-Proof and Strategy-Proof  Voting Rules Under Separable Preferences
SSRN Electronic Journal·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
On Strategy-Proofness and the Salience of Single-Peakedness in a Private Goods Allotment Problem
SSRN Electronic Journal·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
Corrigendum to “On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness” [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238]
Games and Economic Behavior·2021· 1 citedOpen Access
Salvador Barberà
Studies in choice and welfare·2021
Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
Journal of Public Economic Theory·2020Open Access
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
Games and Economic Behavior·2020· 6 citedOpen Access
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Journal of Economic Theory·2020· 21 citedOpen Access
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy
SSRN Electronic Journal·2020· 1 citedOpen Access
On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)·2019· 1 citedOpen Access
On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)·2019Open Access
Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous
Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)·2019Open Access
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
Theory and Decision·2017· 2 citedOpen Access
ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS
International Economic Review·2017· 15 citedOpen Access
Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability
American Economic Journal Microeconomics·2017· 11 citedOpen Access
page 1 of 5Next →

Frequent Co-authors

Alejandro Neme(25), Gustavo Bergantiños(8), Ruth Martı́nez(7), Jorge Oviedo(7), Salvador Barberà(5), R. Pablo Arribillaga(5), Lars Ehlers(4), Dolors Berga(3), Antonio Nicolò(3), Flip Klijn(2), Arunava Sen(2), Bhaskar Dutta(1), Shigehiro Serizawa(1), Ruth. MartÍ nez(1), Jorgee. Oviedo(1), Alejdanro Neme(1), Bettina Klaus(1), Daniel Jaume(1), Inés Moreno de Barreda(1), Marc Vorsatz(1)