Jorge Oviedo

Centro Científico Tecnológico - San Luis — Argentina

Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences

11h-index712citations56works0.12yr avg
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Research Topics

Game Theory and Voting Systems(42), Auction Theory and Applications(27), Game Theory and Applications(13), Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs(10), Economic theories and models(7)

Publications56 total

A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
Top·2025
Dynamic matching games: Stationary equilibria under varying commitments
Journal of Dynamics and Games·2025Open Access
Nash Implementation in a Many-to-One Matching Market
SSRN Electronic Journal·2025Open Access
Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
Barrett's paradox of cooperation in the case of quasi‐linear utilities
Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences·2024· 1 cited
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
A Decomposition from a Substitutable Many-to-One Matching Market to a One-to-One Matching Market
SSRN Electronic Journal·2024Open Access
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
International Journal of Game Theory·2023· 2 cited
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
Theory and Decision·2023· 5 cited
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
arXiv (Cornell University)·2023Open Access
General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Games and Economic Behavior·2022Open Access
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
Mathematical Social Sciences·2022Open Access
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
Games and Economic Behavior·2022· 3 cited
Marriage Market with Indifferences: A Linear Programming Approach
Journal of the Operations Research Society of China·2021· 1 cited
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
Mathematical Social Sciences·2021· 4 cited
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Frequent Co-authors

Pablo Neme(18), Noelia Juárez(13), Jordi Massó(9), Alejandro Neme(9), Ruth Martı́nez(8), Agustín G. Bonifacio(6), Nadia Guiñazú(6), Ezio Marchi(5), Federico Echenique(4), Luis Quintas(4), Elvio Accinelli(3), Filipe Martins(3), Paola B. Manasero(3), Alberto A. Pinto(2), Joel E. Cohen(2), Alejdanro Neme(1), Many-To-One Stable Matchings(1), Patricia Lucia Galdeano(1), DELFINA FEMENIA(1), MABEL MARÍ(1)