Agustín G. Bonifacio

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas — Argentina

Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences

4h-index54citations31works0.52yr avg
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Research Topics

Game Theory and Voting Systems(24), Auction Theory and Applications(20), Game Theory and Applications(10), Economic theories and models(7), Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge(6)

Publications31 total

Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities
ArXiv.org·2025Open Access
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
Economics Letters·2025· 1 cited
On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation
ArXiv.org·2025Open Access
Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences
arXiv (Cornell University)·2025Open Access
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
Economic Theory·2025· 4 cited
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
Games and Economic Behavior·2024
Lattice operations for the stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market
arXiv (Cornell University)·2024Open Access
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
Mathematical Social Sciences·2024
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
Games and Economic Behavior·2023· 8 cited
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
Social Choice and Welfare·2023· 1 cited
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
arXiv (Cornell University)·2023· 1 citedOpen Access
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
International Journal of Game Theory·2023· 2 cited
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
arXiv (Cornell University)·2023Open Access
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
Theory and Decision·2023· 5 cited
Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains
Journal of Mathematical Economics·2023· 2 citedOpen Access
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022· 4 citedOpen Access
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
arXiv (Cornell University)·2022· 1 citedOpen Access
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Frequent Co-authors

Pablo Neme(12), Noelia Juárez(8), R. Pablo Arribillaga(7), Jorge Oviedo(7), Jordi Massó(4), Nadia Guiñazú(4), Elena Iñarra(2), Marcelo Ariel Fernandez(1), Paola B. Manasero(1), Federico Fioravanti(1), Elena Iñarra García(1), María Haydée Fonseca‐Mairena(1)